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Should We Award Mr. Sugano a Valid
Patent? Rethinking the Federal Circuit's
Rigid Written Description Requirement
in Gene Patents
by Ning Bao"
I. Introduction
Whether a separate written description exists in 35 § U.S.C. 112
of the United States Code has been the subject of much debate, and
eventually the Federal Circuit attempted to settle the issue in Ariad v.
Eli Lilly.' An en banc panel consisting of eleven judges decided this
case; and the court also received twenty-five amicus curiae briefs.
The arguments encompassed statutory interpretation, legal
precedence, and policy concerns.3 The nine-judge majority favored a
separate written description requirement, while Judge Rader and
Judge Linn strongly opposed the majority decision. Whether the
holding in Ariad is correct is beyond the scope of this article. Instead,
this article focuses on whether the Federal Circuit has correctly
applied this separate written description requirement to gene patent
cases.
A gene patent is a patent on a specific isolated gene sequence, its
chemical composition, the processes for obtaining or using it, or a
combination of such claims. The Federal Circuit applied a separate
written description requirement to gene patents, which caused chaos.
In order to illustrate the chaos caused, Part II of this article discusses
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, expected May 2013. The
author also holds a M.S. degree in Plant Breeding and Plant Genetics from the University
of Wisconsin, Madison. The author would like to thank Professor Robin Feldman for her
advice and mentorship through the Law and Biosciences Project (L.A.B.).
1.Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
2.1d. at 1340, 1342.
3. Id. at 1343, 1347.
4. Id. at 1339-40.
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two cases involving essentially the same gene invention. Both cases
were decided on the separate written description requirement but
concluded with opposite results. Part III of this article analyzes the
origin and development of the separate written description
requirement within the context of gene patents. Part IV of this article
covers the adverse effects of the separate written description doctrine.
Finally, Part V of this article proposes solutions based on the nature
of a gene patent.
II. Dr. Sugano's Problems
Dr. Haruo Sugano, Director of the Cancer Institute of the
Japanese Foundation since 1973, is a famous Japanese cancer
researcher. Under his directorship, the institute produced a series of
groundbreaking discoveries in cancer research, including the cloning,
sequencing, and clarification of regulatory mechanisms of interferon
P! Interferons are "proteins made and released by host cells in
response to the presence of pathogens..., or parasites, or tumor cells,
allowing communication between cells to trigger the protective
defenses of the immune system that eradicate pathogens or tumors.,
6
Dr. Sugano and his research team filed a U.S. patent application
on October 27, 1980 to cover their interferon invention, but,
encountered priority challenges in a "three-way interference
proceeding.",7 The interference proceeding centered on one subject
matter of "[a] DNA which consists essentially of a DNA which codes
for a human fibroblast interferon-beta polypeptide."' The Patent and
Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
awarded Dr. Sugano priority of invention, and the Federal Circuit in
Fiers v. Revel affirmed the Board's decision.9 In Fiers, the court held
that "[a]n adequate written description of a DNA requires more than
a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a
potential method for isolating it; what is required is a description of
the DNA itself."'0 Relying on Dr. Sugano's earlier Japanese patent
5. Tomoyuki Kitagawa & Ekkehard Grundmann, Congratulatory Editorial in honor
of Dr. Haruo Sugano's 70th birthday, 121 J. CANCER RES. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 493,493
(1995).
6. Interferon, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/ Interferon (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
7. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
& Id. at 1166.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1170.
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application, in which his team had disclosed the complete DNA
sequence encoding human fibroblast interferon 0, the court awarded
Dr. Sugano the priority of invention." Subsequently, Dr. Sugano's
U.S. patent application matured into U.S. Patent No. 5,326,859 ("the
'859 patent") in 1994, in which he claimed "[a] DNA which consists
essentially of a DNA which codes for human fibroblast 13, interferon
polypeptide.'
2
However, the DNA sequence disclosed in Dr. Sugano's Japanese
patent application encodes the precursor of fibroblast interferon,
which consists of 187 amino acids. 3 In contrast, the active fibroblast
interferon 3, consists of 166 amino acids. 4 A signal peptide of twenty-
one amino acids must be cleaved from the precursor in order to make
the mature and active interferon. In 1995 Dr. Sugano, based on the
original U.S. patent application, filed a continuation-in-part
application, and obtained a patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,514,567 ("the
'567 patent") that covers the DNA sequence that encodes the 166
amino acid mature fibroblast of interferon. 6 The '567 patent is more
valuable than Dr. Sugano's earlier '859 patent issued in 1994, because
"known recombinant techniques were not effective to produce
mature [interferon] directly from the naturally occurring gene
because the bacterial cells used in recombinant procedures could not
reliably cleave the 21 amino acid [signal peptide] from the [188 amino
acid] precursor [peptide]."'"
In 2008, twelve years after Dr. Sugano obtained his '567 patent,
he was entangled in another interference proceeding.' The Board
first observed that Dr. Sugano, in his 1980 Japanese application,
disclosed by reference "a scientific article by Knight," in which "the
amino acid sequence from the amino-terminal to 13th amino acid of
the human fibroblast interferon [was] reported."' 9 The Board also
noted that experts had testified "a person skilled in this field would
11. Id.at 1172.
12. U.S. Patent No. 5,326,859 (filed Oct. 27, 1980). Other claims in this patent also
relate to peptide sequence.
13. Goeddel v. Sugano, 617 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
14. Id. at 1351-52.
15. Id. at 1352.
16. U.S. Patent No. 5,514,567 (filed Mar. 6, 1995).
17. Goeddel, 617 F.3d at 1352.
18. Goeddel v. Sugano, No. 105,334 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 29, 2008). [hereinafter "Board
Opinion"].
19. Goeddel, 617 F.3d at 1354.
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have known how to trim the nucleotide sequence of the precursor to
create a recombinant plasmid for use in bacteria to directly express
mature hFIF."2  The Board then reasoned that Dr. Sugano had
disclosed the complete amino acid sequence of the human fibroblast
interferon 1,, and thus in light of Knight's article, "the amino acid
[sequence] of, and DNA sequence encoding, mature hFIF would be
readily apparent. ' '2' Accordingly, the board concluded that Dr.
Sugano was "in possession of the invention of the interference
counts, ' '22 and awarded Dr. Sugano the priority.
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Board's decision.2
The court held that Dr. Sugano's 1980 Japanese application failed to
meet the written description requirement as to the subject matter
later claimed in the '567 patent because "[t]he Japanese application
does not describe a bacterial expression vector that directly produces
the mature hFIF, nor does it suggest producing a modified gene to
directly encode the 166 amino acid mature hFIF., 24 It followed that
Dr. Sugano could not rely on his Japanese application to claim
priority.2'
As a result, Dr. Sugano could not claim the active 166 amino acid
peptide, and lost the more valuable '567 patent even though he was
the first to clone and sequence human fibroblast interferon IP and to
patent the full sequence of the hFIF gene.
III. Doctrinal Analysis of the "Written Description
Requirement" in Gene Patents
The first paragraph of 35 § U.S.C. 112 of the United States Code
mandates that the specification in a patent must meet certain
requirements:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
20. Id. "hFIF" stands for human fibroblast interferon.
21. Id. at 1355 (citing Board Opinion at 44-45).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1357.
24. Id. at 1356-57.
25. See id. at 1357.
[Vol. 5:1
Winter 2013]WRITFEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT FOR GENE PATENTS 89
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.26
The statutory language in section 112 is clear that the written
description in the specification shall "enable any person skilled in the
art to... make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." The
"enablement" and the "best mode" requirements are the only explicit
requirements for the written description in a patent application set
forth in section 112.27 However, there is a written description
requirement that is separate and distinct from the enablement
requirement based on current Federal Circuit case law.
A. The Origin of a Separate and Distinct Written Description
Requirement
The origin of a separate and distinctive written description
requirement can be traced to In re Ruschig,29 which was decided by
the predecessor of the Federal Circuit, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA). The disputed subject matter in Ruschig was
a chemical compound chlorpropamide, a medication which controlled
diabetes mellitus.3 The issue at bar was whether this later claimed
compound was supported by Ruschig's original specification.'
Ruschig had generally disclosed the method of making a family of
compounds among which chlorpropamide can be one specific
compound, but "the compound [chlorpropamide] was not named or
identified by formula in the specification.,
32
The Patent Office, as did the CCPA, faced a challenge here. On
one hand, Ruschig's application specified a chemical process in which,
as the Board of Appeals put it, "[i]f the proper choices of the three
variables in the [disclosed] formula are made, the compound in
question is produced." 33 In other words, Ruschig had enabled 34 a
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
27. Id.
28. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The federal
circuit affirmed that "35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a 'written description of the
invention' which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement." Id.
29. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (CCPA. 1967).
30. Id. at 991.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 993.
33. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed compound,
cholorpropamide, with his disclosed formula. On the other hand,
Ruschig failed to point out that the compound cholorpropamide itself
has blood sugar lowering activity; he only disclosed homologs of
cholorpropamide that have such activity.' So, it would be unfair to
grant Ruschig patent protection on knowledge Ruschig did not
possess when he filed his earliest application. The CCPA. was unable
to deny Ruschig patent protection based strictly on the enablement
requirement, and thus held that "based on section 112, it is on the
requirement thereof that '[t]he specification shall contain a written
description of the invention... ,' [and] it is a question of fact: Is the
specific compound [] described therein?"'
It is worth taking note that the CCPA. clearly did not require
specific means of description to meet the new written description
requirement that is separate from the enablement requirement." The
CCPA. analogized making blaze marks on trees to explain its view of
the written description requirement: The written description
requirement is about making enough blaze marks, so a person skilled
in the art can find a "trail" or some guide in the specification in order
to reach the claimed subject matter."' The court did not require the
inventor to mark specific trees, which represent his claims.39 Ruschig
34. If the word "enable" in sction 112 is read literally, Ruschig did fulfill the
enablement because any person skilled in the art can "make and use" cholorpropamide.
35 U.S.C. § 112. However, it can be said that Ruschig did not enable any person skilled in
the art to "make and use" cholorpropamide because a skilled artisan could not specifically
choose cholorpropamide based on Ruschig's disclosure.
35. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995.
36. Id. at 995-96.
37. "Specific claims to single compounds require reasonably specific supporting
disclosure and while we agree with the appellants, as the board did, that naming is not
essential." Id. at 994. The CCPA. further pointed out that naming or describing each
claimed compounds is not the focus of the written description requirement. Id. ("Surely,
given time, a chemist could name (especially with the aid of a computer) all of the half
million compounds within the scope of the broadest claim, which claim is supported by the
broad disclosure. This does not constitute support for each compound individually when
separately claimed.").
3M Id. at 994-95 ("It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze
marks on the trees. It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one's way through the woods
where the trails have disappeared or have not yet been made, which is more like the case
here to be confronted simply by a large number of unmarked trees. Appellants are
pointing to trees. We are looking for blaze marks which single out particular trees. We see
none.").
39. Id.
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argued that he provided enough "guides," 4 but the court disagreed as
a matter of fact.4'
The CCPA.'s successor court, the Federal Circuit, initially
decided some cases inconsistently with the written description
requirement prescribed in Ruschig, 2 but later firmly stated in Vas Cath
that "35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a 'written description
of the invention' which is separate and distinct from the enablement
requirement., 43  In practice, the written description requirement
assures an inventor cannot add new limitations that were not
disclosed in his earlier application to his earlier broad claims.
44
B. The Application of the Written Description Requirement to Gene
Patent Cases
Because of a gene's chemical nature, it is tempting to borrow
jurisprudential tools from cases involving chemical patents and apply
those tools to gene patents.
In Amgen v. Chugai, the Federal Circuit for the first time
touched on the written description requirement issue in a gene
patent.45 The plaintiff Amgen, Inc. owned a patent covering the DNA
sequence of human erythropoietin ("EPO"), and alleged
infringement by Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Genetics
Institute, Inc. ("GI") for manufacturing recombinant EPO based on
the sequence disclosed in Amgen's patent.46 However, GI owned a
patent, filed earlier than Amgen's patent, claiming a method to purify
human EPO,4 which also hinted at the possibility of obtaining the
DNA sequence of human EPO based on the purified EPO protein.
40. Id. at 993-96.
41. The written description requirement is a question of fact. Id. at 996 ("The issue
here is in no wise a question of its compliance with section 112, it is a question of fact: Is
the compound of claim 13 described therein?").
42 See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421
(Fed.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988) ("The purpose of the [written]
description requirement [of section 112, first paragraph] is to state what is needed to fulfill
the enablement criteria. These requirements may be viewed separately, but they are
intertwined.").
43. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
44. Id. at 1563--64. ("The purpose of the 'written description' requirement is broader
than to merely explain how to 'make and use'; the applicant must also convey with
reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was
in possession of the invention.").
45. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
46. l d at 1204.
47. Id at 1203.
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GI claimed priority over Amgen's patent for the EPO DNA sequence
as a defense to infringement.4
While it was clear that "Fritsch[, the inventor in GI's patent] had
a goal of obtaining the isolated EPO gene," the court's concern could
not center on what Fritsch wanted to achieve at the time he filed his
patent application.49 The proper question was whether Fritsch has
actually enabled a method for obtaining the isolated EPO gene." The
method to isolate the EPO gene described in Fritsch's application
requires preparation of degenerate probes, which in turn relies on
knowing the amino acid sequence of the targeted gene product. At
the time Fritsch filed his application the amino acid sequence of EPO
was unknown to him, and the method of using degenerate probes
itself was very immature and crude.5 ' As a result, the court concluded
that "success in cloning the EPO gene was not assured until the gene
was in fact isolated and its sequence known."52
In terms of the written description requirement, the court was
clear that in general, "[c]onception does not occur unless one has a
mental picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it
by its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or
whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it." 3 However, "when
an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so
as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for
obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to
practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.54
The court provided two authorities to support this novel
disclosure requirement specifically targeting gene patents. The first
authority is a Federal Circuit case similar to Ruschig, in which the
court held that "conception [of a chemical compound] requires both
the idea of the invention's structure and possession of an operative
method of making it.""5  Reliance on such a case is questionable
4& Id. at 1206-07.
49. Id. at 1206.
50. Id. at 1207 ("Fritsch's conception of a process had to be sufficiently specific that
one skilled in the relevant art would succeed in cloning the EPO gene.").
51. Id. at 1206.
52 Id. at 1207. The court also relied on expert testimony from both sides at trial in
reaching this concluding. Id.
53. Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. (citing Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Oka involved
two genuses of compounds. Youssefyeh was not rewarded the priority of the invention,
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because Amgen does not involve adding new limitations to initial
disclosure in order to claim a specific compound or a specific genus of
compounds in a larger family of compounds.-
The second authority is the discussion in Chisum's patent treatise
about simultaneous conception and reduction to practice." The
CCPA. cases discussed in Chisum's treatise all involve a situation
where the inventor cannot establish a conception of his invention
prior to an actual reduction to practice.58 Particularly "[iun the
experimental sciences of chemistry and biology [the] element of
unpredictability frequently prevents a conception separate from
actual experiment and test."' 9 However, the mental formulation of
the invention rises to the level of conception "if the inventor has
conceived the means of putting that formulation in the hands of the
public where no more than routine skill would be required to do so."
Therefore, one possible rationale for the Federal Circuit's new
written description requirement of mandating actual gene sequences
is that actual reduction to practice, i.e., the cloning of the gene, is
required where the disclosed method of isolating the gene is
inherently unpredictable. This rationale would imply that a gene
isolation method shown to be predictable would suffice the written
description requirement in claiming the isolated gene.
Surprisingly, the Federal Circuit rejected this rationale in Fiers
without any explanation.6' In Fiers, Dr. Sugano's first interference
case, Fiers argued that the Federal Circuit decided Amgen on its
particular facts, and the written description requirement of disclosing
DNA sequence should be limited to "cases in which isolation of a
DNA was attended by serious difficulties."'62 However, the court held
that "irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of
isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any
chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than
because he did not conceive the method of making one genus of the compounds, and he
lacked the idea for the other genus. Oka, 849 F.2d at 584.
56. See infra Part IV.A.1.
57. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (citing Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS §
10.04[5] (3rded. 1990)).
58. Donald S. Chisum, CHIStUM ON PATENTS § 10.04[5] (3d ed. 1990).
59. Id (citing Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157,159 (CCPA. 1940)).
60. Id. (citing Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1397 (CCPA. 1974)).
61. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1168.
62. Id.
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by its functional utility." 63  Fiers marked the beginning of a rigid
written description requirement for gene patents.
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly," the
Federal Circuit affirmed this rigid written description requirement.
Eli Lilly involves an invention of recombinant insulin.6 The
University of California ("UC") first sequenced the cDNA of rat
insulin and obtained a patent in which UC broadly claimed insulin-
encoding cDNAs for all vertebrate, including humans.66 To support
this broad claim, UC also described a method of isolating human
insulin cDNA along with the human insulin amino acid sequence that
is needed to complete the cDNA isolation.' The court held UC's
broad claim invalid due to insufficient written description.6
In respect to the claim for insulin-encoding cDNAs for all
vertebrate, the written description was insufficient because
"description of one species of a genus is not necessarily a description
of the genus." 69 "A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved
by means of a recitation of a representative number of cDNAs,
defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus
or of a recitation of structural features common to the members of
the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the
genus."70  Even though the federal circuit does not require the
sequence for each member, it does require the inventor to sequence
large number of cDNAs.
The Federal Circuit in Eli Lilly appeared to mandate disclosure
of the sequence of any claimed gene, but the court loosened its
written description in later cases. In Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe, the
court held that "[it is not correct.., that all functional descriptions
of genetic material fail to meet the written description requirement."7
Enzo developed a method to create DNA probes that preferentially
63. Id. at 1169.
64. Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
65. Id. at 1562.
66. Id. at 1563.
67. Id. at 1567.
68. Id. at 1569.
69. Id. at 1568.
70. Id. at 1569.
71. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956,964 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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bind to Neisseria gonorrhoeae over Neisseria meningitides.n Enzo's
method potentially could produce thousands of probes. Instead of
providing sequences for such probes, Enzo deposited three probes in
a publicly accessible depository.7  The court recognized that
sequencing each probe might be unduly burdensome for Enzo at the
time of the invention, and held deposition of the probes incorporated
by reference in the specification constituted sufficient written
description. 7  However, the court pointed out that whether those
three deposited probes could sufficiently represent the broad claims
covering all probes made possible by Enzo's method is a question of
fact, and thus remanded the case to the trial court.75 It should be
noted that the court separated Enzo's successful reduction to practice
from the written description requirement. The court held that
physical possession of the invention is not necessarily sufficient to
meet the written description requirement, which is "satisfied by the
patentee's disclosure of descriptive means as words, structures,
figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed
invention.
76
Other gene patent cases that do not rigidly require a disclosure
of the claimed sequence involve situations where the inventor
claimed a combination or rearrangement of known DNA sequences.
In Capon v. Eshhar, both Capon and Eshhar described a method of
linking "known antigen-binding-domain producing DNA and known
lymphocyte-receptor-protein producing DNA into a unitary gene that
can express a unitary polypeptide chain," which in turn can induce
antigen specific lymphocytes.' In an interference proceeding, the
Board of Appeals concluded that neither inventor had the priority of
the invention due to their failure to meet the written description
requirement. The Board faithfully applied the rigid written
description requirement in Eli Lily and held:
72. Id. at 960-61. Neisseria gonorrhoeae is the bacterial pathogen that causes
gonorrhea, and its genome sequence is very similar to the genome of another bacteria
Neisseria meningitides. Id.
73. Id. at 961.
74. Id. at 967.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 969 (citing Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
77. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Here, both Eshhar and Capon claim novel genetic material
described in terms of the functional characteristics of the
protein it encodes. Their specifications do not satisfy the
written description requirement because persons having
ordinary skill in the art would not have been able to visualize
and recognize the identity of the claimed genetic material
without considering additional knowledge in the art, performing
additional experimentation, and testing to confirm results.
9
The Federal Circuit recognized the problem of the rigid written
description requirement and distinguished prior cases, explaining
that: "[n]one of the cases to which the Board attributes the
requirement of total DNA re-analysis, i.e., Regents v. Lilly, Fiers v.
Revel, Amgen, or Enzo Biochem, require a re-description of what was
already known."'  The court held that "[t]he [written description]
requirement[] varies with the nature and scope of the invention at
issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in
existence
... [wihen the prior art includes the nucleotide information,
precedent does not set a per se rule that the information must be
determined afresh." Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded
the Board's decision."
Similarly in Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, the Federal Circuit
held that it is unnecessary to recite sequences known to the public,
echoing Capon and holding that "Eli Lilly does not set forth a per se
rule that whenever a claim limitation is directed to a macromolecular
sequence, the specification must always recite the gene or sequence,
regardless of whether it is known in the prior art.""
Yet, in Goeddel v. Sugano, the second interference case involving
Dr. Sugano, the Federal Circuit seemed to take a one-hundred-and-
eighty-degree turn. In Goeddel, neither the parties nor the court
cited Capon or Falko. Yet it should have been Capon applied,
because both the full-length amino acid sequence of the human
fibroblast interferon 03, precursor and the amino acid sequence of the
N-terminal of the mature interferon were disclosed in Dr. Sugano's
78 Id. at 1355.
79. Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1361.
82. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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initial Japanese application. Applying Capon to Goeddel, Dr.
Sugano should have priority to the claimed 166 amino acid peptide in
his continuation-in-part application, because the prior art has
included necessary sequence information."' However, the court
returned to its earlier rigid rule in Fiers, mandating the direct
disclosure of the claimed sequence."
To summarize, the Federal Circuit case law regarding the written
description requirement is not consistent. However, we can conclude
that the Federal Circuit does require at least certain forms of actual
possession of the claimed sequence, either by recitation of the
sequence,.8 deposition of samples in a public depository,"7 or reference
to sequences included in the prior art.8'
IV. Adverse Effects of Implementing the Federal Circuit's
"Written Description Requirement" in Gene Patents
A. In the Context of Gene Patents, the Federal Circuit Has in Effect
Confused Its Separate Written Description Requirement with a
Heightened Enablement Standard.
In order to understand the effect of implementing a separate
written description requirement in the long line of gene patent cases,
we must go back and visit the first case in the line, Amgen v. Chugai.
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit provided two lines of authorities to
support its separate written description doctrine: the Ruschig case and
cases cited in Chisum's patent treatise;89 however, neither authority
justifies the application of a separate written description requirement
in the context of gene patents.
83. Goeddel v. Sugano, 617 F.3d 1350, 1354-57 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The only difference
between Capon and Goeddel is that Goeddel involved a cleavage of a known sequence
from another known sequence while Capon involved a combination of known sequences.
84. Goeddel, 617 F.3d at 1356.
85. Id. at 1351.
86. See Regents, 119 F.3d at 1569.
87. See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 967.
88. See Falko-Gunter, 448 F.3d at 1367.
89. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
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1. The Gene Patent Cases Decided by the Federal Circuit Did Not
Concern the Issue in Ruschig.
The Ruschig court concerned a specific issue: whether the
inventor added new limitations to his broad claim.9 In other words,
this is a question of "new matter." Judge Rader, in his dissent in
Ariad, agreed with this view.9' A separate written description in
Ruschig is needed only when the inventor has enabled a genus but
later claims a specific species.
In contrast, none of the gene patent cases discussed in Part III
has any bearing on this particular issue in Ruschig, because the
inventors in those cases did not try to limit the broadest claims. Using
the CCPA.'s trail mark analogy, if there is no forest but only one
tree, markings are completely unnecessary.
2. The Federal Circuit Should Focus on Enablement Instead of Written
Description.
The cases cited by Chisum's patent treatise concern a different
issue, which is whether the conception of an invention can happen
before its actual reduction to practice.93 This requires a factual
inquiry," and is actually a question of enablement. In other words,
the court should determine whether an envisioned method of
isolating a gene could enable a skilled in the art to make and use the
same invention. For example, the Amgen court needed to determine
whether Fritsch's cloning method could be successful. 9 Similarly, the
Fiers court had to determine whether Fiers' proposed cloning method
would work.9
90. See Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 991.
91. Ariad Pharm., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1363 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("Before 1982, this
court's predecessor referred to this doctrine as a new matter prohibition with respect to
claims." (referencing In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (CCPA. 1981) ("The proper
basis for rejection of a claim amended to recite elements thought to be without support in
the original disclosure ... is § 112, first paragraph, not § 132 .... [The latter section] is
properly employed as a basis for objection to amendments to the abstract, specifications,
or drawings .... ") (emphasis added))).
92. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 994-95 ("It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one's way
through the woods where the trails have disappeared - or have not yet been made, which
is more like the case here- to be confronted simply by a large number of unmarked
trees.").
93. See supra notes 59-61.
94. See Chisum, supra note 58.
95. See Amgen 927 F.2d at 1206-07.
96. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1172.
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3. The Application of a Separate Written Description Requirement in
Gene Patent Cases Is a Result of a Heightened Enablement Standard.
It is unfortunate that the Federal Circuit has abbreviated the
enablement analysis in gene patents by assuming that gene patents
cannot be conceived until actual reduction to practice. The Amgen
court accepted method of preparation as one way to describe a
DNAq but further held, without explanation, that "when an inventor
is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to
distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining
it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has
occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.'"" In Fiers, the
court held that "irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the
method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception
of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance
other than by its functional utility."99  These holdings reflect a
heightened enablement standard in gene patents. In sum, the Federal
Circuit, in the context of gene patents, considers actual possession of
the claimed gene as prerequisite to prove enablement.
The separate written description requirement is merely a logical
extension of such a heightened enablement standard. Since actual
possession is the prerequisite to prove enablement, it follows that the
inventor should be able to describe the actually possessed gene with a
method other than the envisioned method of isolation. Therefore,
the court will look for such description of a gene, and thus, an
enablement question is converted into a question of written
description.
B. Empirical Data Shows a Discrepancy in Respect to the Standard of
Written Description Between the Patent Office and the Courts.
One scholar, Crouch, found that a separate written description
doctrine has little impact in the process of patent prosecution."o
Crouch studied 2,858' ex parte Board of Patent Appeals and
Interference opinions decided during the first half of 2009.'0' Among
these, only twenty-three (0.8%) cases were decided based on the
97. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169.
100. Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description
Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 Nw. U.L. REV. 382, 382 (2010).
101. Id. at 392.
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written description doctrine, and "[a]ll twenty-three of these
outcome-determinative decisions involved the rejection of claims that
had been added or amended during prosecution and addressed the
concern that the added limitations were not properly described in the
original specification."'02  Crouch made hypothetical doctrinal
changes by assuming an elimination of the separate written
description requirement and reexamined all cases. l 3 Interestingly,
the elimination of a separate written description requirement had no
impact on the cases' outcomes, as long as the traditional new matter
doctrine was kept intact.'(4 In essence, the USPTO does not (or need
not) have a separate written description requirement doctrine to
decide patentability. This result echoes Judge Gajarsa's view that an
independent written description requirement is not a necessity of
patent law, at least in the process of patent prosecution.'I5
Another scholar, Rabinowitz, did research on the effect of a
separate written description doctrine in patent litigation.'06 In
contrast to its slight impact on patent prosecution, the separate
written description doctrine plays a much more important role in
court. Rabinowitz reviewed patent litigation cases from 2000 to 2009
and found that, on average, challenges to patent validity based on
written description requirement had a 43-percent success rate.'("
Reading this result in light of the Grouch study, it can be concluded
that the written description standard applied at the PTO and in the
court are quite different.
The adverse effects of this discrepancy are obvious. First, it has
created uncertainty among inventors and patent attorneys regarding
the standard of written description requirement. Second, it has
created great risk to the validity of gene patents. It seems that the
patent office has a bar, with respect to the written description
requirement, much lower than the courts'. As a result, the court,
using a much higher written description standard, will invalidate
many granted gene patents. This risk of invalidation lowers the value
of gene patents.
102. Id. at 393-94.
103. Id. at 393.
104. Id. at 394.
105. See Ariad Pharm, 598 F.3d at 1360-61.
106. Aaron B. Rabinowitz, Ending the Invalidity Shell Game: Stabilizing the
Application of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Litigation, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci.
& TECH. 127 (2011).
107. Id. at 141.
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C. Independent Inventors and Nonprofit Organizations Are
Disadvantaged.
Ariad, and a few amicus briefs filed in Ariad, argued that the
current written description requirement in the Federal Circuit
"disadvantages universities to the extent that basic research cannot be
patented."'O'  Judge Lourie and Judge Newman discredited this
concern. Both judges argued that "[b]asic scientific principles are not
the subject matter of patents."'O'  This view might be true in the
broader context of all scientific disciplines, but it is problematic in the
context of gene patents.
Genes, unlike man-made chemicals or machines, exist in nature.
However, it requires human activities to purify and isolate the genes
in order to utilize them. The U.S. Patent system awards isolation and
purification of "product[s] of nature."'1 0 The process of isolating a
gene often involves discovery of new scientific principles.
The Federal Circuit's written description requirement, at least
when it is applied to gene patents, is actually a heightened
enablement requirement in disguise,"' rigidly mandating actual
possession of the claimed gene. Such a system benefits the
organization that can implement an inventive idea the fastest.
Deduction of structural information of a large biomolecule is very
expensive; 2 thus, there is no doubt that the current patent system
benefits large companies with the most resources.1
3
Historically, the U.S. patent system has been concerned with
providing protection and opportunity for small independent
inventors. However, independent inventors cannot in practice obtain
gene patents due to the rigid written description requirement.
Biotechnology experimentation is quite expensive, and no
independent inventor can afford to carry out the experiment he
conceived and then determine the sequence or enough data to show
actual possession. As a result, no matter how ingenious and
108. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353.
109. Id. at 1359. See also id. at 1353.
110. See Parke-Davis & Co v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F.496, 497 (2d Cir. 1912).
111. See supra Part IV.A.
112. J. Jason Williams, Protecting the Frontiers of Biotechnology Beyond the Genome:
The Limits of Patent Law in the Face of the Proteomics Revolution, 58 VAND. L. REV. 955,
962-63 (2005) ("Because of the complexity currently inherent in the field, it is estimated
that protein structure determination may cost up to $100,000 dollars per protein with a
discovery period that may extend for years.").
113. Id. at 988.
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scientifically sound an idea is, it cannot mature into a patent, because
the rigid written description requirement prohibits constructive
reduction of a gene patent.
V. Solutions
In order to solve the chaos caused by the application of a
separate and rigid written description requirement to gene patents,
two questions must be asked. First, why does the U.S. patent system
require adequate disclosure? Second, what is the nature of a gene
patent?
A. The Disclosure Requirement Is a Measure to Ensure the Fair
Bargain in the U.S. Patent System.
The purpose of the U.S. patent system, which can be found in the
Constitution, is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."...4  To serve this purpose, a quid pro quo was created: an
inventor must reveal his invention to society in exchange for the grant
of patent rights from the government."5
The court may create its own disclosure doctrines, including a
separate written description requirement, to ensure that the scope of
the patent rights matches the inventor's contribution of disclosing his
invention. However, no disclosure doctrine would be accepted if it
put too great a burden on inventors and thereby created an unfair
bargain.
B. The Application of a Separate Written Description Requirement
Depends on the Inventor's Contributions in a Gene Patent.
U.S. patent law accepts a "new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof" as patentable subject matter."' A gene
sequence can be categorized as a "composition of matter." However,
genes do exist in nature, and thus, their patentability is questionable
under the court-created rule that "[t]he laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas [are] not patentable. '" 7 Therefore, in
order to analyze the application of a separate written description
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
115. Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor's Contribution, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3
(2005).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
117. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980).
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requirement to gene patents, we must consider why the court
accepted genes as a special kind of product of nature and patentable
subject matter. The court has provided rationales for two scenarios in
which the application of a separate written description requirement
will be treated differently.
1. A Separate Written Description Requirement May Be Applied to a
Gene Patent If the Inventor's Contribution Is Creation of Nonnatural
Composition of Matter.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the inventor claimed a strain of
bacteria that carries a recombinant plasmid, allowing such bacteria to
digest petroleum."8 The Patent Office rejected this claim because
bacteria are a "product of nature."" 9 However, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Patent Office, because the claimed
bacteria do not occur naturally, and "a non-naturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity
[-]" is patentable subject matter.' 2 In other words, a gene patent that
has disclosed a useful artificial sequence or nonnatural combination
of gene sequences should be treated the same as a new machine or
composition of matters that never existed in nature.
It is understandable that a separate written description
requirement may be needed in this scenario, because the inventor
must describe in details something that never existed. In the context
of gene patents, the court may apply a separate written description
requirement to cases like Capon and Falko-Gunter Falkner, where
the inventors' contributions were revelations of nonnatural
combinations of natural gene sequences.,2'
2. A Separate Written Description Requirement Shall Not Be Applied to
a Gene Patent If the Inventor's Contribution Is Identifying the Natural
Sequence of This Gene.
Unlike the engineered bacteria in Diamond, many gene patents
only claim the DNA sequence of natural occurring genes;'2 thus, the
question of the patentability of these bare gene sequences cannot be
answered by Diamond. As a matter of claim drafting, a natural gene
118. Id. at 305.
119. Id. at 306.
120. Id. at 309.
121. See Capon, 418 F.3d at 1360; see also Falk-Gunter, 448 F.3d at 1368.
122. Reid Adler, Corporate Patent Strategies in the Genomics Industry, 3 YALE L. &
TECH. 1 (2000).
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sequence can be claimed as part of a larger DNA construct, the
backbone of which contains other genes to facilitate transcription or
expression of the inserted novel gene." Even though such a DNA
construct does not occur in nature, the court should treat this kind of
claim as a bare gene sequence, because the inventor's only real
contribution is the identification of the natural sequence of the gene.
Patenting a natural gene sequence is supported by a much earlier
case, Parke-Davis v. Mulford.'24 In Parke-Davis, the inventor
discovered a method to make purified adrenaline. Judge Learned
Hand held that there is good reason to grant a patent to "the first to
make [adrenaline] available for any use by removing it from the other
gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course possible
logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every
practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically."'1
Claim 1 in Parke-Davis' patent reads, "1. A substance possessing the
herein-described physiological characteristics and reactions of the
suprarenal glands in a stable and concentrated form, and practically
free from inert and associated gland tissue.' ' 6 This claim, read in
light of the specification, 1" is a "product-by-process" patent. A gene
patent that claims a bare gene sequence is the like Parke-Davis'
adrenaline patent, which is a "product-by-process" patent. The
Federal Circuit in Amgen has recognized a gene patent as a "product-
by-process",2
It is illogical and unnecessary to apply a separate written
description requirement to "product-by-process" patents. If the
process has been clearly revealed, the product made by this process
does not require much description, and any functional description
should suffice.2 9
123. See DNA construct, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA._onstruct (last updated Apr. 16,2012).
124. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F.95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) affd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F.496 (2d Cir.
1912).
125. Id. at 103.
126. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F.496, 497 (2d Cir. 1912).
127. See Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d 1365 (As Phillips confirmed, and this court has
confirmed and reconfirmed, claims must be read "'in view of the specification"' to
determine their meaning.).
128. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 ("It is important to recognize that neither Fritsch
nor Lin invented EPO or the EPO gene. The subject matter of claim 2 was the novel
purified and isolated sequence which codes for EPO.").
129. See, e.g., Parke-Davis, 196 F.496 (2d Cir. 1912).
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3. Rebuttal Should Be Allowed to Challenge the Heightened Enablement
Standard in Gene Patents.
As discussed,'" the root cause of the chaos of disclosure doctrine
in the context of gene patents is that the Federal Circuit has applied a
heightened enablement requirement for gene patents. In essence, a
constructive reduction to practice does not suffice as enablement.
Instead, an inventor must actually reduce to practice his conceived
gene invention that was essentially a "product-by-process," before
claiming the product per se.131 One commentator calls this court-
created rule "super enablement" and argues that no precedent or
logic supports this requirement.'32
This heightened enablement requirement in gene patents was
built on the assumption that conception cannot occur before actual
reduction to practice. This assumption is reasonable because "[i]n the
experimental sciences of chemistry and biology [the] element of
unpredictability frequently prevents a conception separate from
actual experiment and test."'3 However, the court should keep in
mind that this is just an assumption, and rebuttal should be allowed to
challenge this assumption.
In sum, if the court limits application of a separate written
description requirement to cases where the invention is a non-natural
sequence, and allows rebuttal to the court's heightened enablement
requirement, the chaos caused by the application of a separate
written description requirement to gene patents will be alleviated.
130. See supra Part IV.A.
131. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169 ("A product-by-process claim normally is an after-the-
fact definition, used after one has obtained a material by a particular process. Before
reduction to practice, conception only of a process for making a substance, without a
conception of a structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute
a conception of the substance claimed as a process. Conception of a substance claimed per
se without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or
definitive chemical or physical properties.").
132. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998).
133. Chisum, supra note 58 (citing Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157, 159 (CCPA
1940)).
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